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The Problem of Narrative Explanation
A story does more than recount events; it recounts events in a way that
renders them intelligible, thus conveying not just information but also
understanding.  We might therefore be tempted to describe narrative
as a genre of explanation.1 When the police invite a suspect to “tell his
story,” they are asking him to explain the blood on his shirt or his
absence from home on the night of the murder; and whether he is
judged to have a “good story” will depend on its adequacy as an expla-
nation.  Can we account for the explanatory force of narrative with the
models of explanation available in the philosophy of science? Or does
narrative convey a different kind of understanding, which requires a
different model and perhaps even a term other than ‘explanation’?
This question arises for various disciplines in which narrative comes
into play.  For historians, it is the question whether narrating historical
events conveys understanding over and above that conveyed by sub-
suming the same events under the generalizations of economics, polit-
ical science, or sociology.  For clinical psychologists, it is the question
whether fitting symptomatic behaviors into a life-story adds to the
understanding gained by fitting them into diagnostic categories.  Even
the police or the jury must ask themselves what sort of explanatory
value there is in a suspect’s giving his alibi in the form of a story. 
~
As I have suggested, the question how storytelling conveys understand-
ing is inseparable from the question what makes for a good story.  Of
course, a good story can be good in many accidental respects, ranging
from the elegance of its diction to the personal attractions of its char-
acters.  But what makes a story good specifically as a story—what makes
it a good example of storytelling, or narrative—is its excellence at a par-
ticular way of organizing events into an intelligible whole.
According to Aristotle, what makes a portrayal of events hang
together in this way is a plot, or muthos, which requires the portrayed
events to follow one another “by necessity or probability.” The necessi-
ties and probabilities that Aristotle has in mind appear to be of the kind
that could be revealed instead by a scientific explanation:
J. DAVID VELLEMAN
2
   Plots are either simple or complex. … The action, proceeding in the way
defined, as one continuous whole, I call simple, when the change in the
hero’s fortunes takes place without Peripety [Reversal] or Discovery; and
complex, when it involves one or the other, or both.  These should each
of them arise out of the structure of the Plot itself, so as to be the conse-
quence, necessary or probable, of the antecedents.  There is a great differ-
ence between a thing happening propter hoc and post hoc.2
If Aristotle is right, then a plot must convey understanding in the same
way that it qualifies as a plot, to begin with—namely, by providing each
event with antecedents from which to follow as a necessary or probable
consequence.  And the understanding conveyed by a plot, in that case,
would be no different from that conveyed by other genres of explana-
tion.
This view is implicit in famous remarks by E.M. Forster on the plot-
ting of a novel: 
“The king died and then the queen died,” is a story. “The king died and
then the queen died of grief” is a plot. … Consider the death of the
queen.  If it is in a story we say “and then?” If it is in a plot we ask “why?”
That is the fundamental difference between these two aspects of the
novel.3
An answer to the question “why?” is of course an explanation.  Hence
Forster conceives of a plot as a form of explanation, and he seems to
have causal explanation in mind, since the element that makes for a
plot, in his example, is the queen’s grief, which is a causal link between
her death and the king’s.
This view of narative has recently been elaborated by Noël Carroll, in
a paper entitled “On the Narrative Connection.” Following Morton
White, Carroll distinguishes among three modes of discourse for
recounting events: annals, which represent events as temporally
ordered; chronicles, which represent temporally ordered events pertain-
ing to a single subject; and narrative, which requires some additional
connection among the events:
If I say, “I woke up; later I dressed; still later I went to class,” I suspect that
most people would agree that this falls short of a full-fledged narrative,
although the events cited might be turned into ingredients of a narrative.
But why isn’t it a narrative properly so called?  To put it vaguely—because
the connection among the events alluded to by it is not tight enough.4 
The connection that is “tight enough” to transform a chronicle into a
narrative, according to Carroll, is the connection between causes and
the effects for which they were, in the circumstances, necessary
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(though perhaps not sufficient).  Carroll illustrates the need for such
“narrative connections” by means of the following example:
Consider this putative narrative: “Aristarchus hypothesized the heliocen-
tric theory thereby anticipating Copernicus’ discovery by many centu-
ries.” […] If there is no line of influence stretching from Aristarchus’
discovery to Copernicus’, I, at least, find it strained to think that this is
narrative. It is an interesting series of events.  Indeed, mention of the sec-
ond event in this series retrospectively reveals something of the signifi-
cance of the earlier event, and … retrospective significance is a frequently
occurring feature of narrative.  However, where the events bear no sort of
causal relation to each other, they seem more of the order of coincidence
than of narrative.5 
[R]etrospective significance, though a typically recurring and explicable
feature of narrative, should not be mistaken as the mark of narrative.  For
the temporally ordered discourse “Aristarchus hypothesized the heliocen-
tric system and then centuries later Copernicus discovered it again”
affords the apprehension of retrospective significance—it indicates the
point of mentioning Aristarchus’ discovery in light of Copernicus’—but it
is not, as I have argued, a narrative proper inasmuch as it lacks a narrative
connection.”6
In Carroll’s terminology, the discoveries of Aristarchus and Copernicus
are ingredients for a chronicle but not a narrative, because they are
successive events pertaining to a common topic but are causally unre-
lated.  Carroll thinks that the successive events in a narrative must
occur not just post hoc but also propter hoc.  Carroll goes on to suggest
that the causal content of a narrative underlies its explanatory poten-
tial:
Perhaps a related consideration in favor of my view of narrative is that nar-
rative is a common form of explanation.  In ordinary speech, we use nar-
ratives to explain how things happened and why certain standing
conditions were important.  Narrative is capable of performing this role
because it tracks causal networks. … Thus, insofar as what we call narra-
tives are explanatory, it seems advisable to regard narrative properly so
called as connected to causation and not merely temporal succession.7
Here Carroll states the null hypothesis of my inquiry, that the explan-
atory force of a narrative is due to information that would be equally
explanatory if recast in non-narrative form.  I want to consider whether
there might not, after all, be some explanatory force peculiar to the
narrative form itself.
Rejecting what I have called the null hypothesis of my inquiry will
not entail denying that a narrative typically organizes events into chains
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of cause and effect.  Nor will it entail denying that the absence of cau-
sality or probability from a narrative can render it internally incoherent
and thus powerless to convey understanding.  What counts as a single
event in the summary of a plot—birth, death, marriage, separation,
reunion—is invariably a complex of many events causally related.
Without such clumps of causality, there would be nothing but a soup of
physical occurrences, out of which no plot could ever precipitate.
Hence the idea of a plot without causality is absurd.
In order to reject my null hypothesis, however, it will be sufficient to
show that something other than causality or probability serves the func-
tion of differentiating narrative from other genres and endowing it
with its peculiar explanatory force.  A narrative may require many
things without which it would make no sense—decipherable spelling
or pronunciation, for example.  But spelling and pronunciation aren’t
the distinguishing characteristics of narrative or the source of its dis-
tinctive power to convey understanding.  If the same is true of causality
and probability, then Carroll’s conception of “the narrative connec-
tion” will have to be rejected.
~
Before going further, I should regiment the miscellaneous terms that I
have inherited from Aristotle, Forster, and Carroll.  I like Forster’s term
‘plot’, and Aristotle’s muthos, for the principle of organization by which
narrative confers intelligibility on narrated events.  I also like the terms
‘annals’ and ‘chronicles’ for ways of recounting events without giving
them a plot.  But I don’t like Forster’s use of ‘story’ for the genus of
which annals and chronicles are plotless species.  To my ear, the term
‘story’ implies the presence of a plot.  Maybe the larger genus should
be labeled “tales,” which encompasses anything that’s told.  Anyway,
that’s how I propose to use the terms, reserving both ‘story’ and ‘nar-
rative’ for tales that have a plot and may therefore have whatever
explanatory force is peculiar to narrative.
One last preliminary remark, about the terms ‘explanation’ and
‘explanatory force’.  I have already hinted that the mode of under-
standing characteristically produced by narrative may turn out to be so
different from that produced by ordinary explanations as to call for a
different term.  In my experience, linguistic intuitions vary widely on
this issue.  By the time I have offered my account of how narrative con-
veys understanding, some readers will think that I have shown how nar-
rative explains, and others will think that I have shown, if anything, that
narrative is not at all explanatory.  I regard this disagreement as merely
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terminological and hence as resolvable by stipulation.  I use the term
‘explanatory force’ for the power of narrative to convey understanding
of some kind or other.  Whether that power is best described as explan-
atory is a question that won’t concern me.
~
My skepticism about Carroll’s conception of the narrative connection
is aroused, to begin with, by his example of a non-story.  I agree with
Carroll that he doesn’t really tell a story when he says, “Aristarchus
hypothesized the heliocentric theory thereby anticipating Copernicus’
discovery by many centuries.” Yet this sentence may fall short of being
a story, not because it describes events that are causally unrelated, but
because it merely alludes to the second event by way of characterizing
the first, without ever asserting that the second occurred.  Even the
shortest story must recount more than one event.
This account of Carroll’s failure to tell a story does not apply to his
second attempt, which goes like this: “Aristarchus hypothesized the
heliocentric system and then centuries later Copernicus discovered it
again.” Here Carroll recounts two events, one after the other, and yet
he claims that he still hasn’t told a story.  I don’t know whether to accept
this claim, but it is in any case considerably weaker than what Carroll is
committed to claiming.  He is committed to claiming, not just that he
hasn’t told a story about Aristarchus and Copernicus, but that there is
no true story to be told about them, given their mutual isolation in the
web of causality.  I am not convinced: I am fairly certain that one could
tell a story about these events, and without inventing a causal connec-
tion that wasn’t there.
Consider Aristotle’s example of a disjointed story:
Tragedy, however, is an imitation not only of a complete action, but also of
incidents arousing pity and fear.  Such incidents have the very greatest
effect on the mind when they occur unexpectedly and at the same time in
consequence of one another; there is more of the marvelous in them
then than if they happened of themselves or by mere chance.  Even mat-
ters of chance seem most marvelous if there is an appearance of design as
it were in them; as for instance the statue of Mitys at Argos killed the
author of Mitys’ death by falling down on him when a looker-on at a pub-
lic spectacle; for incidents like that we think to be not without a mean-
ing.8
Here Aristotle is trying to reconcile the requirement that plotted
events follow “by necessity or probability,” on the one hand, with the
requirement that they arouse fear and pity, one the other, given that
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these emotions are enhanced by the element of surprise.  The usual
way to reconcile these requirements, according to Aristotle, is to have
the plotted events “occur unexpectedly and at the same time in conse-
quence of one another.” Another way of obtaining the same effect,
however, is for causally unrelated events to have what Aristotle calls “an
appearance of design,” as when a murderer is accidentally killed by a
statue of his victim.
Surely, the death of Mitys’ murderer makes for a good story.  We
might interpret Aristotle as claiming that the “appearance of design” in
this story is actually an appearance of causality or probability, because
the audience is led to imagine an avenging spirit, or some other force
of cosmic justice, behind the falling statue.  But I think that the story
holds up even under an absurdist reading, which takes the murderer’s
death for an accident.  On this reading, the murder of Mitys and the
death of his murderer are no more connected than the discoveries of
Aristarchus and Copernicus.  Even so, the one pair of disjointed events
seems like more of a story than the other.  Something is present in Aris-
totle’s pair of events that’s missing from Carroll’s, and it needn’t be an
imagined causal connection.  What is it?
The crucial difference between these examples, I think, is that in
Aristotle’s the sequence of events completes an emotional cadence in
the audience.  When a murder is followed by a fitting comeuppance,
we feel indignation gratified.  Although these events follow no causal
sequence, they provide an emotional resolution, and so they have a
meaning for the audience, despite lacking any causal or probabilistic
connection.  No similar emotional cadence is resolved by Copernicus’
rediscovery of what Aristarchus had previously discovered—not, at
least, in Carroll’s telling.  The possibility in principle of fashioning
these discoveries into a story is due to the possibility of finding some-
thing that they might mean to an audience in emotional terms.
Any sequence of events, no matter how improbable, can provide
material for storytelling if it completes an emotional cadence.  Twins
separated at birth are ideal protagonists for a story even if their even-
tual reunion is a fluke.  A discovery due to serendipity, a tragedy nar-
rowly averted by dumb luck, a mundane act that unforeseeably
becomes the last in a life accidentally cut short—these are the stuff not
only of literary storytelling but of legend, gossip, and other forms of
everyday narrative.  Whether a winning lottery ticket or a fatal house-
fire makes enough of a story to be featured on the local news depends,
not on whether its causes can be told, but rather on whether the sur-
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rounding circumstances will call up feelings that can be brought to
some resolution by this inexplicable stroke of good or bad fortune.  So
long as we feel an anxiety relieved or a hope dashed, we have the sense
of hearing a story, even if we have no idea why events took the relevant
turn.  Similarly in Forster’s example, the king’s death need not have
contributed to the queen’s in order to provide materials for a story.  Let
the queen laugh at the king’s death and later slip on a fatal banana
peel: the audience will experience the resolution characteristic of a
plot.
It is no coincidence, I think, that in transforming Forster’s non-story
into a story, I have made it sound like a joke.  Joke telling is one genre
of storytelling.  Attempts to generalize about the internal logic of jokes
are notoriously ill conceived: there is no particular way that a stretch of
discourse or its subject matter must be constructed in order for it to
qualify as a joke.  What makes a stretch of discourse into a joke is that
it reliably brings the audience to the resolution of laughter, by means
of whatever internal logic or illogic it can.  In my view, a stretch of dis-
course can qualify as a story, more generally, by reliably producing in
the audience some emotional resolution, of which laughter is just one
example.
Of course, my talk of resolving emotional cadences is vague and met-
aphorical.  Offering a clear and literal account of this phenomenon
will be my primary task for the remainder of this paper.
Scenarios
An alternative to Carroll’s view of narrative explanation can be found
in Roger Schank’s Tell Me a Story, which elaborates on work by Schank
and others in artificial intelligence.  According to Schank, “storytelling
and understanding are functionally the same thing”;9 and yet Schank
does not require that stories convey causal or probabilistic informa-
tion.
In Schank’s view, we understand things by assimilating them to what
is familiar; and so we understand new experiences, for example, by
assimilating them to past experiences stored in memory.10 The most
memorable experiences, according to Schank, are the ones that we
have stored in the form of stories.  We put these experiences into
words, by telling ourselves about them, and then remember them “as
told to” ourselves, a form that is richly indexed with keywords and
hence readily accessible for purposes of understanding future experi-
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ences.  When other people tell us a story, we understand it by assimilat-
ing it to stories of our own, retrieved from memory.  And what we can
then assimilate to a story of ours includes, not only their story, but also
whatever their story is about, so that we end up understanding their
subject matter and not just their discourse about it.  That’s why people
can explain something to us by telling us a story about it: their story
helps us to assimilate the thing to what’s familiar, by assimilating it to
our own stories.
Unfortunately, Schank has nothing to say about which descriptions
of events amount to stories.  For all that Schank says, “The king died
and then the queen died” can be a perfectly good story, especially if we
remember a prior story to which it can be assimilated—say, “The duke
died and then the duchess died.” Having learned of the ducal deaths
and remembered them “as told to” ourselves, we ought to find the royal
deaths intelligible, according to Schank, because we can assimilate
them to a known story.  But surely the one pair of deaths won’t help us
to understand the other simply by virtue of being remembered in dis-
cursive form.11
The End
A more promising avenue of inquiry is suggested by Louis Mink’s phi-
losophy of history.12 Dissatisfied with the suggestion that historical nar-
ratives render events intelligible by revealing their causes,13 Mink
characterized narrative understanding as comprehension in the literal
sense of a “grasping together”—“a characteristic kind of understand-
ing which consists in thinking together in a single act … the compli-
cated relationships of parts which can be experienced only seriatim.”14
When history is presented in a coherent narrative, Mink argued,
“actions and events, although represented as occurring in the order of
time, can be surveyed as it were in a single glance as bound together in
an order of significance, a representation of a totum simul.”15
Mink presented this account of historical understanding as a varia-
tion on the views of W. B. Gallie, which he summarized as follows: 
In following a story, as in being a spectator at a [cricket] match, there
must be a quickly established sense of a promised although unpredictable
outcome: the county team will win, lose, or draw, the separated lovers will
be reunited or will not.  Surprises and contingencies are the stuff of sto-
ries, as of games, yet by virtue of the promised yet open outcome we are
enabled to follow a series of events across their contingent relations and
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to understand them as leading to an as yet unrevealed conclusion without
however necessitating that conclusion.16
Mink did not share Gallie’s concern with unpredictability and its role
in drawing us along through a story; indeed, he was not interested in
how we follow a story when reading or hearing it for the first time, since
historians often tell us stories whose outcomes we already know.
Rather, Mink was interested in how the characterization of events in
terms of their relations to an outcome enables us to comprehend them
as a completed whole after the story is finished.
Consider, for example, the story of Treasure Island, whose very title
already hints at the “promised although unpredictable outcome” in
light of which the story’s various episodes are to be comprehended.
Every major event in the story has some intrinsic description of its own,
but it also has some description in relation to the outcome in question.
Each major event can be regarded as either motivating or furthering or
hindering or somehow bearing on the pursuit of Flint’s treasure.  And
within the story, other promised outcomes serve a similar organizing
role.  As soon as the word ‘mutiny’ is uttered in the confrontation
between the Captain and the Squire, subsequent events can be com-
prehended as revelations of, responses to, actions upon, or deviations
from the sailors’ efforts to sieze control, which can themselves be com-
prehended as an obstacle to recovering the treasure.  The mutiny and
the recovery of the treasure are thus common points of reference
towards which we can orient our conception of the other events in the
story; and having thus aligned our conception of the events, we can
grasp them together rather than merely review them in succession.17 
Although we thereby gain comprehension, which might be called a
kind of understanding, this mode of understanding doesn’t necessarily
rest on an explanation of the events understood.  Of course, the nar-
rators of Treasure Island offer explanations of many events, but these
explanations are self-contained digressions from the narrative and do
not contribute to the sort of comprehension that interests Gallie or
Mink.  Again, many of the events that are comprehensible by virtue of
their relation to the mutiny, or to the recovery of the treasure, are
related to these outcomes as individually necessary or jointly sufficient
conditions for them, and so they provide a partial explanation of why
the mutiny occurred or why the treasure was recovered.  But equally
many events may be comprehensible by virtue of being related to these
outcomes as hindrances, inhibitions, or obstacles; and the comprehen-
sibility of the story does not depend on its making clear why the favor-
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able conditions won out over the unfavorable.  In short, how
comprehensible the story is, in Mink’s sense of the term, does not
depend on how well it explains why the treasure was found.18 Rather,
it depends on how well the events in the story can be grasped together
as bearing on this outcome in some way or other, favorably or unfavor-
ably.19
Mink’s view may appear to differ from Schank’s in taking us to
understand events by subsuming them under outcome-oriented con-
cepts such as “treasure-hunt” or “mutiny” rather than by assimilating
them to entire scenarios.  Yet the two theories may be more similar than
they first appear.  On the one hand, Schank emphasizes the impor-
tance of “story skeletons,” which are general schemas into which many
particular stories can fit: ‘treasure-hunt’ and ‘mutiny’ could easily be
the names for such schemas.  On the other hand, Mink’s theory raises
a question about the concepts involved in narrative comprehension.
How do we know what a mutiny is, for example, if not by knowing the
general scenario for a mutiny?  Our concept of a mutiny may thus
involve a story-skeleton or the memory of a paradigm case.  When we
comprehend a sequence of events under the concept of a mutiny, as
envisioned by Mink’s theory, we may well be assimilating those events to
a story-skeleton or a particular remembered story, as envisioned by
Schank’s. 
~
What Mink and Gallie add to this view is the idea that the organizing
principle of a story is the “promised although unpredictable out-
come”—that is, the ending.  A narrative must move forward not only in
the sense of telling one event after another but also in the sense of
approaching or at least seeming to approach some conclusion to those
events, some terminus, finish, or closure.
Here I should elaborate on a point at which I merely hinted earlier,
about the difference between narrative and the artistic genres that
employ it.  A novel or a theater piece need not reach a conclusion or
even seem to approach one.  But a novel or a theatre piece need not be
a work of narrative, either; it may be a work of narrative only in parts,
or it may be “of” narrative only in the sense of commenting on the
requirements of narrative by pointedly defying them.  A bad story can
make for a great novel (though perhaps not the sort of great novel that
one likes to read).  The necessity of an ending is not inherent in the
aesthetics of the novel or play but in the nature of storytelling, a form
of discourse that a novel or play need not employ.
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Note that for the sake of providing an ending, causality (or proba-
bility) is both unnecessary and insufficient.  An outcome can provide a
conclusion to events whether or not it is their effect or likely sequel,
whereas causes and effects can succeed one another ad infinitum with-
out ever reaching a conclusion.  A subsequent event can put an end to
prior events only if those antecedents have shown some potential that
it manages to discharge, some void that it manages to fill, some
cadence that it manages to resolve.
And now I have returned to the vague and metaphorical terms of my
introductory remarks, about cadences being resolved, to which I have
only added more vague and metaphorical talk.  I therefore turn to the
task of replacing these metaphors with a clear and literal description of
at least one phenomenon that they represent.
~ 
The idea that stories are structured by their endings has long been
familiar among literary critics.  Frank Kermode gives a vivid illustration
of the idea in his lectures entitled The Sense of an Ending:
Let us take a very simple example, the ticking of a clock.  We ask what it
says: and we agree that it says tick-tock.  By this fiction we humanize it, make
it take our language.  Of course, it is we who provide the fictional differ-
ence between the two sounds; tick is our word for a physical beginning,
tock our word for an end. … It can be shown by experiment that subjects
who listen to rhythmic structures such as tick-tock, repeated identically,
“can reproduce the intervals within the structure accurately, but they can-
not grasp spontaneously the interval between the rhythmic groups,” that
is, between tock and tick, even when this remains constant.[20]  The first
interval is organized and limited, the second not. … The fact that we call
the second of the two related sounds tock is evidence that we use fictions
to enable the end to confer organization and form on the temporal struc-
ture.  The interval between the two sounds is now charged with significant
duration.  The clock’s tick-tock I take to be a model of what we call a plot,
an organization that humanizes time by giving it form; and the interval
between tock and tick represents purely successive, disorganized time of
the sort that we need to humanize.21
Kermode has much to say about why we need to “humanize” time by
creatively hearing some of its tickings as tocks.  The topic lends itself to
lofty speculation, about our inability to keep our balance without hori-
zons; or our desire for endings that we can outlive; or for endings that
we can’t, which save us from what Bernard Williams calls “the tedium of
immortality.”22 Yet my topic is not why we need endings but what end-
ings are—what gives an event, or the description of an event, the power
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to organize its antecedents in the way that’s distinctive of an ending.
Why is tock the ending and tick the beginning, rather than vice versa, or
neither?
A critic who has attempted this question is Peter Brooks, who likens
the cadence of a narrative to the vicissitudes of an instinct in Freudian
theory.23 The beginning of a story, according to Brooks, is like the stim-
ulus that prompts the search for stimulus-reduction, the itch that
demands scratching; the middle is like the postponement of stimulus-
reduction by obstacles and misdirected efforts; and the end is like the
satisfying discharge that pacifies, if only temporarily.  I think that
Brooks is right to look for the nature of endings in the nature of human
affect, but I also think that his focus on Freud’s theory of instinct is
unduly narrow and controversial.  Freudian theory is not needed to
support the simple observation that human affect follows a cycle of
provocation, complication, and resolution.
Ronald de Sousa has proposed what might seem like the inverse of
Brooks’s analysis: whereas Brooks analyzes narrative in terms of affect,
de Sousa analyzes affect in terms of narrative, hypothesizing that each
human emotion has a “paradigm scenario” similar to the stories pos-
ited by Schank:
We are made familiar with the vocabulary of emotion by association with
paradigm scenarios.  These are drawn first from our daily life as small chil-
dren and later reinforced by the stories, art, and culture to which we are
exposed.  Later still, in literate cultures, they are supplemented and
refined by literature.  Paradigm scenarios involve two aspects: first, a situ-
ation type …, and second, a set of characteristic or “normal” responses to
the situation, where normality is first a biological matter and then very
quickly becomes a cultural one.24
Like Schank, de Sousa envisions that these scenarios are stored in
memory and retrieved as a means of understanding what we experi-
ence: they are “not so much stories up for interpretation as stories in
terms of which other stories and situations are themselves interpreted.”25
When brought to bear on a situation, paradigm scenarios determine
what we focus on, what we tend to notice, and how we are disposed to
respond: “When a paradigm scenario suggests itself as an interpreta-
tion of a current situation, it arranges or rearranges our perceptual,
cognitive, and inferential dispositions.”26
I want to borrow from Brooks and de Sousa, first, the idea that the
earliest stories in our lives are about the vicissitudes of our emotions;
and second, the idea that the shape of those stories is determined, in
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the first instance, by the nature of human affect, although it may sub-
sequently be modified by cultural influences.  The cadence that makes
for a story is that of the arousal and resolution of affect, a pattern that
is biologically programmed.  Hence we understand stories viscerally,
with our bodies. 
The notion of visceral understanding is illustrated by Kermode’s
case of a ticking clock.27 For I suggest that we understand the cadence
of tick-tock with the muscles of our face and mouth, which are tensed for
the first syllable and relaxed for the second. (For other examples of this
phenomenon, see note 28.) The cycle of tension and relaxation is built
in to the very nature of muscle, and it’s what leads us to perceive tick as
the beginning and tock as the end.  In much the same way, we under-
stand the cadence of a story with the natural cycles of our emotional
sensibility.
Emotion and Time
The idea that emotions are essentially diachronic—that their nature
consists in how they unfold over time—is supported by empirical
research, which has recently been summarized by Craig DeLancey in a
book entitled Passionate Engines.29 Drawing on the work of psychobiol-
ogists and neuropsychologists, DeLancey defends an affect program the-
ory of the emotions, according to which they involve coordinated suites
of physiological, phenomenological, and behavioral routines that are
triggered by conditions of particular kinds.
The first episode in the natural history of an emotion is its arousal by
characteristic conditions.  In this respect, emotions differ from some
other motivational attitudes, such as desires.  It is not in the nature of
most desires to be elicited by conditions of any particular kind.  From
the fact that someone wants something, we cannot ordinarily infer how
he came to want it; but from the fact that he is afraid, we can draw some
plausible inferences about how he came to be in that state.  The second
episode in the history of an emotion is often a sequence of physiolog-
ical symptoms, such as perspiration or accelerated heartbeat, often
accompanied by distinctive feelings as well—a lump in the throat, a
knot in the stomach, a tingling at the base of the spine.  Then there are
purely reflexive behavioral symptoms, including facial expressions,
such as smiling or scowling; bodily postures, such as cringing; and var-
ious programmed behaviors, such as laughing, crying, or gagging.
Equally reflexive are the associated patterns of attention and interpre-
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tation of the sort mentioned by de Sousa: a heightened awareness of
danger, for example, or greater sensitivity to physical beauty.  Next
come motivational dispositions toward behaviors that can be per-
formed in the form of deliberate actions, though they may also issue
impulsively under the force of an overwhelming urge: gamboling, flee-
ing, attacking, caressing, and so on.  Finally, each emotion has a char-
acteristic pattern of decay and extinction, involving conditions that
characteristically dispel it, and the mental states that characteristically
remain in its wake.
The diachronic nature of emotion figures prominently in Aristotle’s
Poetics—specifically, in his requirement that that the drama must elicit
fear and pity and then bring them to an appropriate katharsis.30 Yet
Aristotle draws no explicit connection between the emotional vicissi-
tudes of a tragedy and the structure of its muthos, or plot, which Aristo-
tle analyzes into the elements of beginning, middle, and end.  Brooks’s
thesis, which I am seeking to generalize, is that the diachronic nature
of emotion underlies Aristotle’s analysis of plot, because beginning,
middle, and end must ultimately be defined in terms of the arousal and
resolution of emotion.  
Aristotle’s own elaboration on this analysis, which at first may seem
tautologous, is in fact simply false.  He says:
A beginning is that which does not itself follow necessarily from some-
thing else, but after which a further event or process naturally occurs.  An
end, by contrast, is that which itself naturally occurs, whether necessarily
or usually, after a preceding event, but need not be followed by anything
else.  A middle is that which both follows a preceding event and has fur-
ther consequences.31
Yes, of course—but, on second thought, no.  The beginning of a story
always has sufficient antecedents, causally or probabilistically speaking,
and the ending is always sufficient for further consequences.  There are
no beginnings or endings in the flow of events.  The sense in which
nothing precedes the beginning or follows the ending of a story is emo-
tional.  The story begins with the circumstances that initiate some
affect, or sequence of affects, and it ends when that emotional
sequence is in some way brought to a close.
This process needn’t be confined to the arousal and resolution of a
single emotion.  One emotion often gives way to another: puzzlement
to curiosity, curiosity to foreboding, foreboding to horror, horror to
grief—or perhaps instead to anger, which gives way to resentment, and
so on.  Unlike a chain of causation, however, a sequence of emotions
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has beginnings and endings, because emotions naturally sort them-
selves into ticks and tocks. That’s why a sequence of motions can pro-
duce what I have called a cadence. Emotions naturally qualify as
initiatory or conclusory in virtue of various features, of which I shall
mention only a few.
Some emotions are aroused by circumstances independently of the
subject’s prior emotional state, whereas others register the impact of
events on a prior emotion.  Fear and anger, for example, can be elicited
out of the blue, by danger and injury, respectively; whereas disappoint-
ment, gratification, and grief must develop out of some antecedent
attitude that can be disappointed, gratified, or aggrieved.  The inten-
tional contents of the latter emotions often include their emotional
antecedents.  Disappointment conceives of its object as having been
hoped-for, grief conceives of its object as having been loved, and so on;
hope, fear, and anger need not conceive of their objects in terms of any
prior affect.
Emotions like hope, fear, and anger are by nature unstable, because
they motivate behavior, or are elicited by circumstances, that ultimately
lead to their extinction.  Thus, fear motivates flight, which leads to the
alleviation of fear; and hope is aroused by future prospects, which
either materialize or not, turning hope into gratification or disappoint-
ment.  By contrast, grief and gratification are stable, because their elic-
iting conditions and resulting behaviors are not conducive to change.
Grief is a response to permanent loss, gratification a response to deci-
sive gain, and neither emotion motivates efforts to alter its causes.
Hence grief and gratification, although they tend to fade with time,
neither lead to nor result from a process that replaces them with other
emotions.
These differences among emotions allow for some broad generali-
zations.  Fear can initiate or continue an emotional sequence but it
cannot resolve one; grief can resolve an emotional sequence but it
rarely initiates one.  The reason is that fear can be aroused out of the
blue and then motivates behavior that leads to further emotional devel-
opments, whereas grief develops out of prior attitudes, and alludes to
them, but tends not to be an engine of emotional change.
Suppose, then, that the emotion of pity, as it figures in Aristotle’s
account of tragedy, is the audience’s compassionate response to a char-
acter’s grief.  In that case, Aristotle’s requirement that a tragedy arouse
fear and pity would amount to the requirement that it lead its audience
through a complete emotional cadence, from an essentially initiatory
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emotion to an essentially conclusory one—from an emotional tick to an
emotional tock.  The emotions of fear and pity, in Aristotle’s account of
tragedic emotion, would therefore correspond to the beginning and
ending in his account of tragedic plot.
Consider another genre that is typically defined in emotional terms.
Puzzlement is typically aroused out of the blue—indeed, as a response
to out-of-the-blueness—and it tends to motivate behavior designed to
resolve it into the emotions associated with discovery. The latter
include horror, which is a temporarily paralyzing emotion that is there-
fore static and self-sustaining at first; yet horror eventually gives way to
fear, which motivates behavior designed to resolve it into relief.  Thus,
horror is by its nature an emotional complication, temporarily delay-
ing a sequence initiated by puzzlement and concluding in the relief of
fear.  Horror is an emotional middle, to which puzzlement stands as the
beginning and relief as the end.  And in carrying the audience through
this emotional cadence, a tale displays the structure of what is known as
a horror story.
An Exception and a Qualification
Before considering how this conception of narrative accounts for its
explanatory force, I want to consider an apparent counterexample to
the conception itself.  This counterexample serves as a reminder of a
qualification that I issued earlier, and in so doing it actually reinforces
the account, in my view.
The example comes from Walter Benjamin’s essay “The Storyteller”:
The first storyteller of the Greeks was Herodotus.  In the fourteenth chap-
ter of the third book of his Histories there is a story from which much can
be learned.  It deals with Psammenitus.
When the Egyptian king Psammenitus had been beaten and captured
by the Persian king Cambyses, Cambyses was bent on humbling his pris-
oner.  He gave orders to place Psammenitus on the road along which the
Persian triumphal procession was to pass.  And he further arranged that
the prisoner should see his daughter pass by as a maid going to the well
with her pitcher.  While all the Egyptians were lamenting and bewailing
this spectacle, Psammenitus stood alone, mute and motionless, his eyes
fixed on the ground; and when presently he saw his son, who was being
taken along in the procession to be executed, he likewise remained
unmoved.  But when afterwards he recognized one of his servants, an old,
impoverished man, in the ranks of the prisoners, he beat his fists against
his head and gave all the signs of deepest mourning.
From this story it may be seen what the nature of true storytelling is. …
A story … does not expend itself.  It preserves and concentrates its
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strength and is capable of releasing it even after a long time.  Thus Mon-
taigne referred to this Egyptian king and asked himself why he mourned
only when he caught sight of his servant.  Montaigne answers: “Since he
was already overfull of grief, it took only the smallest increase for it to
burst through its dams.” Thus Montaigne.  But one could also say: The
king is not moved by the fate of those of royal blood, for it is his own fate.
Or: We are moved by much on the stage that does not move us in real life;
to the king, this servant is only an actor.  Or: Great grief is pent up and
breaks forth only with relaxation.  Seeing this servant was the relaxation.
Herodotus offers no explanations.  His report is the driest.  That is why
this story from ancient Egypt is still capable after thousands of years of
arousing astonishment and thoughtfulness.32
As Benjamin’s commentary makes clear, the tale of Psammenitus leaves
open all the questions that a story might be expected to answer, accord-
ing to any theory of narrative explanation.  It doesn’t tell us why Psam-
menitus wept at the sight of his captive servant after having stood
unmoved by that of his captive children, and it consequently fails to
guide us toward any emotional resolution.  Are we seeing royal pride
brought low, toward which we might feel a touch of Schadenfreude?  Are
we seeing shared humanity affirmed, toward which we might feel a
somber awe?  Or are we simply seeing, as Montaigne suggests, a case of
“the last straw,” which we might recognize with sorrowful empathy?
Because the tale of Psammenitus doesn’t arrive at any emotional
conclusion, it doesn’t qualify as a story according to my account, strictly
applied.  If my account were meant to be applied strictly, the tale of
Psammenitus would constitute a decisive counterexample.  But as I
mentioned earlier, many genres are based on narrative without
employing it straightforwardly, and they tend to be described as genres
of narrative by extension.  My account of narrative is meant to explain
why these cases are called stories, although it doesn’t include them in
the core extension of the term.
In the present case, the storyteller, Herodotus, is clearly inviting us,
the audience, to read a story into the events that he has recounted.
These events can be interpreted to yield an indefinite number of sto-
ries, as they are interpreted to describe different arcs of emotion.33
The invitation to take an active part in completing the story is what
makes the tale of Psammenitus so stimulating.  And the fact that Hero-
dotus has left part of the storytelling to us does not prevent us from say-
ing that he has told a story.  
Of course, this example does not clearly distinguish between my
account of narrative and Aristotle’s, since its lack of an emotional res-
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olution is due to the absence of a causal or probabilistic explanation
for the protagonist’s behavior.  Note, however, that not just any telling
of an unexplained event would have left us with the sense of a story
awaiting completion.  Any number of unexplained developments
might have ensued upon Psammenitus’ attendance at the triumphal
procession, and he might have done or said any number of unex-
plained things, most of which, if placed at the close of Herodotus’ tale,
would have turned it into a surreal fragment of prose rather than a pro-
tean story.  (“Immediately following Psammenitus’ son in the proces-
sion came a man walking on his hands.  Psammenitus turned to
Cambyses and remarked, ‘You have helmet-hair.’” And so on.)  Hero-
dotus’ tale amounts to a protean story only because it closes with what
must be Psammenitus’ conclusory emotion about his defeat, which
clearly calls for a conclusory emotion on our part, which remains to  be
determined by our interpretation of the events.
Emotional Understanding
I have now put forward two premises of an inference.  The first premise
is that the understanding  provided by narrative should be attributable
to the nature of narrative itself—to that in virtue of which a recounting
of events qualifies as a story.  The second premise is that a description
of events qualifies as a story in virtue of its power to initiate and resolve
an emotional cadence in the audience.  What follows from these pre-
mises is that the power to initiate and resolve an emotional cadence
ought to endow narrative with its power to render events intelligible.
But how?
For the answer to this question, I return to Mink’s suggestion that a
story explains by providing comprehension, in the sense of “actions
and events … surveyed as it were in a single glance as bound together
in an order of significance.”34 As I argued earlier, this suggestion bears
some resemblance to Schank’s hypothesis that we understand events by
assimilating them to familiar scenarios.  The difference is that Mink
focuses on scenarios for which we have summary concepts, such as
“treasure-hunt” and “mutiny,” which summarize the scenarios in terms
of their “promised although unpredictable outcome”—that is, in terms
of their ending.  When events are grasped under such a concept, “the
complicated relationships of parts which can be experienced only seri-
atim” are subsumed under “a representation of a totum simul.”
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What Mink is trying to express in these remarks can be expressed
more clearly, I think, in terms of a story’s emotional structure.  To begin
with, the sequence of emotions through which a story leads its audi-
ence is typically a familiar sequence, such as the sequence that I out-
lined above, from puzzlement to curiosity to foreboding to dismay to
grief (a sequence that underlies, for example, the plot of Oedipus
Rex).35 A story therefore enables its audience to assimilate events, not
to familiar patterns of how things happen, but rather to familiar patterns
of how things feel.  These patterns are not themselves stored in discursive
form, as scenarios or stories: they are stored rather in experiential,
proprioceptive, and kinesthetic memory—as we might say, in the mus-
cle-memory of the heart.36 Although the audience may have no discur-
sive memory of events such as those of the story, it nevertheless has an
experience of déja senti, because its emotional sensibility naturally fol-
lows the ups and downs of the story, just as a muscle naturally follows
the cycle of tension and release.
What’s more, the emotion that resolves a narrative cadence tends to
subsume the emotions that preceded it: the triumph felt at a happy
ending is the triumph of ambitions realized and anxieties allayed; the
grief felt at a tragic ending is the grief of hopes dashed or loves denied.
Hence the conclusory emotion in a narrative cadence embodies not
just how the audience feels about the ending; it embodies how the
audience feels, at the ending, about the whole story.  Having passed
through the emotional ups and downs of the story, as one event suc-
ceeded another, the audience comes to rest in a stable attitude about
the series of events in its entirety.  
Thus, the audience of a story understands the narrated events, first,
because it knows how they feel, in the sense that it experiences them as
leading it through a natural emotional sequence; and second, because
it knows how it feels about them, in the sense that it arrives at a stable atti-
tude toward them overall.  That’s how the “parts experienced seriatim”
are “bound together in an order of significance.” The audience may or
may not understand how the narrated events came about, but it under-
stands what they mean—what they mean, that is, to the audience itself,
in emotional terms.
~
This account of narrative explanation sheds light on various debates
about the epistemological role of narrative.  Consider, for example, the
arguments of Hayden White to the effect that narrative history is
unavoidably fictional, because it projects story-forms onto events that
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are not in themselves “storied.”37 Noël Carroll has written an admira-
ble refutation of White, showing in particular that he relies on an unre-
alistic and indeed incoherent conception of what a genuinely non-
fictional mode of history would be.38 White criticizes narrative history
for falling short of a complete and perspectiveless reproduction of the
past, as if such a thing were possible or even desirable.  As Carroll
points out, narrative history is not untrue simply by virtue of being
selective or taking a point-of-view.
If I am right about the nature of narrative, however, then there is a
kernel of truth in the midst of White’s confusions.  Insofar as historical
discourse conveys understanding by organizing the past into stories,
what it conveys is not an objective understanding of how historical
events came about but a subjective understanding of how to feel about
them.  The historian fashions the past into stories by deploying some
episodes to set off an emotional tick to which subsequent episodes can
provide the answering tock—or, as White puts it, by dividing the past
into beginnings and endings.  The storytelling historian thus brings his
audience to some emotional closure about a course of events viewed in
retrospect.  This effect of narrative history is not in itself an illusion or
projection—not, at least, unless all emotion involves an illusion or pro-
jection of a significance that events do not really have.  Even if we reject
an error theory of emotion, however, we must recognize that the audi-
ence of narrative history is subject to a projective error.  Having made
subjective sense of historical events, by arriving at a stable attitude
toward them, the audience is liable to feel that it has made objective
sense of them, by understanding how they came about.  Having sorted
out its feelings toward events, the audience mistakenly feels that it has
sorted out the events themselves: it mistakes emotional closure for
intellectual closure.
There is a temptation to describe this error as a projection of narra-
tive form onto reality.  The subjective understanding enjoyed by the
audience is one and the same as the emotional closure in virtue of
which the historian’s discourse achieves an ending and hence the form
of a story.  We may therefore be tempted to say that the error commit-
ted by the audience is to project the form of an ending onto the nar-
rated course of events.  Yet what would the audience be thinking if it
literally committed the error so described?  Would it be thinking that
historical events came to an end, in the sense of having no sequel?
Such an error would be unlikely, to say the least.  The error that’s likely
in response to narrative history—and that might be misdiagnosed as
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the projection of an ending onto events—is rather the error of mistak-
ing subjective for objective understanding.  The audience mistakes the
resolution of its feelings about the events for a resolution of other ques-
tions about them.
Of course, this error is not unavoidable, and so it does not vindicate
White’s contention that narrative history is unavoidably false.  But it is
an error to which narrative is at least conducive, and against which the
audience of narrative must be on its guard.
~
This projective error is especially dangerous in light of our tendency to
take explanatory force as probative. If offered two incompatible
accounts of what happened on some occasion, we tend to credit the
account that has more explanatory coherence.  We are more inclined
to believe that things happened as described in the account that better
explains how they came to happen that way.  This inclination is ratio-
nal, provided that the explanation offered is indeed an explanation of
how things came about—what I have called an objective explanation.
In response to a subjective explanation of the sort provided by narra-
tive, the same inclination is irrational.
Consider again the story of Mitys’ murderer, who was killed by the
statue of his victim.  For us, who do not believe in avenging spirits, the
story ought to be utterly implausible.  What are the chances of such a
bizarre coincidence?  Yet I suspect that if you examine your attitude
toward this story, you will find yourself lending it more credence than
it deserves. “Killed by the statue of his victim?” you think: “Aha!  Of
course.”
Admittedly, this effect might be due to wishful thinking in the
present case: you’d like to believe that malefactors are punished, if only
by random chance.  But the same effect occurs in cases where wishful
thinking is not at work.  Why isn’t the story of Oedipus a mere absurdity
to those of us who don’t believe in fate?  The answer is that it resonates
with a familiar emotional pattern, of desperately fleeing from disaster
only to find, with horror, that we have been rushing toward it instead.
“Undone by his own efforts?” we think: “Aha!  Of course.” Now, for
Oedipus to be undone by his own efforts required a chain of prior coin-
cidences that are breathtaking in their implausibility.  But we know the
feeling of being undone by our own efforts, and so the story makes
sense to us in emotional terms.  We don’t know why it happened, but
we know how it feels.  Not knowing why it happened, we ought to ques-
tion whether it really did happen that way; but knowing how it feels, we
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have a sense of understanding, and we mistakenly allow our skepticism
to be allayed. 
If I am right about the projective error on which these stories
depend for their plausibility, then philosophers of law should think
twice before celebrating the role of narrative in legal argumentation.
Storytelling is indeed an effective strategy for persuading judges and
juries, but it may owe its effectiveness to the error that I have been
examining, the confusion between emotional and intellectual
instances of “Aha!” Encouraging a lawyer to make his case with a story
may be like encouraging a politician to make his point with a joke—
good strategy, but not conducive to the social ends of rationality and
truth.  Telling a story is often a means to being believed for no good rea-
son. 
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(“Narrative Emotions: Beckett’s Genealogy of Love,” Ethics 98 (1988): 225–54,
at 233-34)
[I]f stories are … primary vehicles of emotion teaching, then we might say that
to have an emotion will be (or centrally involve) the acceptance of a certain sort
of story. (235)
I do not agree that stories construct what fear or love is for a child.  Fear, certainly, and
possibly also love are basic emotions whose nature is largely determined antecedently to
acculturation.  I do believe that basic emotions are subject to cultural elaboration, which
may be accomplished by stories, among other means.  Although anger is a pre-cultural
endowment of all human beings, road-rage is not; although jealousy may be a basic emo-
tion, it’s unclear whether envy is, and it’s likely that Schadenfreude is not.  No doubt,
someone could learn Schadenfreude from stories, but I see no reason to suppose that
storytelling is essential to learning it.
36 Here I take a decisive departure from Schank and de Sousa.
37 Hayden White, Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century Europe
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973); Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural
Criticism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987); The Content of Form (Balti-
more: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1987).
38 “Interpretation, History and Narrative,” in Beyond Aesthetics, 134–66.

